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Would Position Limits have made any difference  
to the “Flash Crash” on May 6, 2010 
Bernard Lee1, Shih-fen Cheng2, Annie Koh3 
Singapore Management University 
 
Abstract 
On May 6, 2010, the US equity markets experienced a brief but highly unusual drop in prices 
across a number of stocks and indices.  The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
4
 fell by 
approximately 9% in a matter of minutes, and several stocks were traded down sharply before 
recovering a short time later.  Earlier research by Lee, Cheng and Koh
5
 (2010) identified the 
conditions under which a “flash crash” can be triggered by systematic traders running highly 
similar trading strategies, especially when they are “crowding out” other liquidity providers in the 
market.  The authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010 exhibit patterns consistent with the 
type of “flash crash” observed in their earlier study (2010).  While some commentators assigned 
blame to high-frequency trading, our analysis was unable to identify a direct link to high-frequency 
trading per se, but rather the domination of market activities by trading strategies that are 
responding to the same set of market variables in similar ways, as well as various pre-existing 
market micro-structural safety mechanisms with unintended consequences when triggered 
simultaneously.  The consequent lack of market participants interested in the “other side” of their 
trades may result in a significant liquidity withdrawal during extreme market movements.  This 
paper describes the results of 9 different simulations created by using a large-scale computer 
model to reconstruct the critical elements of the market events of May 6, 2010.  The resulting 
price distribution provides a reasonable resemblance to the descriptive statistics of the second-
by-second prices of S&P500 e-Mini futures from 14:30 to 15:00 on May 6, 2010.  There are no a 
priori assumptions made on asset price distributions, and our description of market dynamics is 
purely based on the structure of the market and the key types of market participants involved.  
This type of simulation avoids “over-fitting” historical data, and can therefore provide regulators 
with deeper insights on the possible drivers of the “flash crash”, as well as what type of policy 
responses may work or may not work under comparable market circumstances in the future.  Our 
results also lead to a natural question for policy markers:  If certain prescriptive measures such as 
position limits have a low probability of meeting its policy objectives on a day like May 6, will there 
be any other more effective counter measures without unintended consequences?   
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Figure 1.  DJIA, Dollar-Yen, Nikki and Gold prices on May 6, 2010. (Data courtesy of SGX)  
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1. Introduction  
1.1  Brief Summary of Historical Events 
There are many publicly-available, archeological accounts of the market events of May 6, 2010.  We will 
not attempt to repeat those accounts here.  In this Section, we will aim to provide a relatively 
straightforward summary, for the purpose of setting the proper context of our simulation analysis.  Given 
that we are simply summarizing basic facts for the convenience of our audience, we would like to 
acknowledge the relevant sources all at once, including the Joint CFTC-SEC Preliminary Report
6
 and its 
corresponding Final Report,
7
 as well as a research report published by the CME Group shortly after the 
May 6, 2010 incident.
 8
  In addition, we have benefited from primary sources of data as provided by the 
CME Group as well as the SGX.
9
 
The trading day of May 6, 2010 started with unsettling political and economic news due to the European 
debt crisis.  Just one day before (May 5, 2010), the Greek government‟s debt crisis boiled over into 
violence on the street of Athens.  These factors had weighed on global markets before US trading hours, 
and the US equity market was down in early trading.  At around 2:30pm (all times are shown in Eastern 
Standard Time), the overall decline suddenly accelerated, after a rush of sell orders.  Within a few 
minutes, both the S&P 500 Index and its June 2010 E-Mini futures dropped by more than 5%, as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  June 2010 E-mini futures on S&P 500 vs. SPDRs.  (Data courtesy of CME Group) 
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CFTC staff conducted a post-mortem analysis of the top 10 largest longs and shorts.  Those analyses 
suggest that, in most cases, traders with the largest longs and shorts in fact traded on both sides of the 
market.  In other words, there was no obvious one-sided “squeezing” of the market.  The CME order 
books on futures also showed that there were many more sell orders than buy orders from 2:30pm to 
2:45pm.  However, the volume of E-mini futures surged to 8 times of that of SPDRs (after adjustments) 
between 2:45pm and 2:50pm.  To most traders, this was a clear indication that the futures market was 
driving the cash market not the other way around. 
The bid-ask of the June 2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures widened considerably at about 2:45pm, triggering 
CME‟s Globex stop logic functionality.  The stop logic functionality aims to prevent the triggering of stop-
loss orders that would have resulted in transactions at price levels below the contract‟s “no-bust range”, 
leading to an avalanche of price declines due to order-book imbalances.  This functionality put the market 
in a “reserve” state when orders could be entered, modified or cancelled but not concluded.  It was, in 
fact, triggered in the E-mini market at 2:45:28pm for 5 seconds, precisely when the E-mini contract hit its 
low of the day.  Since futures were not traded during these 5 seconds, the linkages between the cash and 
the futures markets would have broken down despite that, in theory, US stock futures traded on the CME 
are supposed to be coordinated with cash equity trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
The majority of the single-name stocks had declines consistent with the 5% decline in June 2010 E-Mini 
S&P 500, which traded at its low of 1056 by 2:34:28pm.  However, 3 stocks – namely, Proctor and 
Gamble (PG), 3M (MMM) and Accenture (ACN) – continued to decline even as the E-Mini S&P 500 
contract hit its low and then began to reverse upward.  These three stocks hit their Liquidity 
Replenishment Points (LRPs) at 2:45:52pm, 2:50:36pm and 2:46:10pm respectively, while their lowest 
trading prices of $39.37, $67.98 and $0.01 were reported at 2:47:15pm, 2:45:47pm and 2:47:54pm, 
respectively.   
 
 
Figure 3.  June 2010 E-mini futures on S&P 500 vs. PG, MMM and ACN.  (Data courtesy of CME Group) 
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Eventually, Nasdaq announced that they would bust all trades that were more than 60% off the market.   
Of the US-listed securities with declines of 60% or more away from the 2:40pm transaction prices 
(resulting in busted trades), approximately 70% were ETFs.  This suggested that ETF as an asset class 
were affected more than any other categories of securities.  One hypothesis is that ETF might have been 
widely used by investors as inexpensive short hedges and in placing stop-loss market orders. 
Several hypotheses were raised by the CFTC-SEC Preliminary Report to the Joint Advisory Committee 
on Emerging Regulatory Issues as to what might have caused the trading experience of May 6, 2010: 
1. Disparate trading venues in the US – This is also known as “market fragmentation”.  It refers to the 
fact that multiple exchanges, alternative trading systems and private matching networks (dark pools) 
run by broker-dealers all trade the same stocks in the US simultaneously.  While the overall liquidity 
may appear substantial, whenever there is a liquidity problem faced by one of the many trading 
venues containing a fraction of the total liquidity, the manner in which that venue reacts to the 
problem may initiate an overall chain reaction – such chain reaction may not have happened at all, if 
the total liquidity for each stock can be consolidated into a single trading venue. 
 
2. “Liquidity Replenishment Points” (LRPs) at the NYSE and similar practices – Whenever a LRP is 
triggered, the NYSE will go into a “go slow” mode and pause momentarily to allow liquidity to enter 
the market.  This may have exacerbated the problem, in that automated trading orders are most likely 
rerouted to other possible trading venues, resulting in a net loss of trading liquidity at the primary 
market.  This may also have the effect of triggering similar cautionary procedures in parallel trading 
venues, driving liquidity further from the market. 
 
3. “Self-Help Remedy” – Two exchanges declared “self help” against NYSE Arca in the minutes prior to 
2:40pm, after NYSE Arca repeatedly failed to provide a response to incoming orders within one 
second.  Such declarations free the declaring exchanges from their obligations to route unmatched 
orders to the affected exchange, resulting in additional loss of trading liquidity.  For instance, a high 
bid and a low ask on the same stock appearing on two different exchanges, that could have been 
matched if there was rerouting, would fail to be matched under such circumstances. 
 
4. Stop loss market orders – Some market participants left sell orders much lower than current prices as 
market orders to sell, primarily as a stop-loss precaution.  Those orders were not expected to be 
executed.  In a fast-falling market, these stop-loss market orders might have triggered a chain 
reaction of automated selling orders, and the sellers would have limited time to reconsider those 
orders.  Typically, such orders would be left by institutional investors, and the quantity involved could 
be quite substantial as compared to the existing liquidity for a particular stock.   
 
5. Short sales and stub quotes – Short sales against stub quotes accounted for more than 70% of the 
busted trades between 2:45pm and 2:50pm, and approached a staggering 90% between 2:50pm and 
2:55pm.  The fact that stub quotes were never intended to be executed, and that there would be 
limited (if any) upside to short selling against near-zero bids, suggests that at least some of these 
short sales were placed in a somewhat automated manner, since it would be unlikely for any 
experienced human trader to execute such orders. 
 
1.2 Prior Research and Current Study 
In Lee, Cheng and Koh (2010), the author constructed a simulated market with multiple types of computer 
agents, including a market maker, systematic traders (deploying several varieties of trend-following 
strategies, which are among the most common techniques deployed by hedge funds) and “retail-like” 
investors who place randomized bids and asks in the market in a mean-reverting manner.  Unlike 
traditional market simulations, the evolution of asset prices is the direct result of how these agents are 
trading against each other as in real markets, and there are no a priori assumptions on asset price 
distributions.  While market simulation is hardly new, the academic contributions of our work are:  
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i) we provide a convincing description of market dynamics based on the structure of the market and the 
type of participants,  
ii) the resulting price distribution provides a reasonable resemblance of the descriptive statistics of 
certain commodity markets; and  
iii) yet the simulation does not contain so many degrees of freedom that it essentially “over-fits” historical 
data, resulting in limited predictive power and insights.   
The key findings from our earlier study include the following: 
1. In theory, trend-following is a trading strategy that can be replicated by lookback straddles, which is a 
traditional “long gamma” strategy.  The theoretical strategy is supposed to have unlimited upside but 
limited downside, much alike any option.  However, most option pricing theories work under the 
unrealistic assumptions of infinite liquidity and zero transaction costs.  What we have observed is 
that, as we deliberately withdraw liquidity from the market, the profit-and-loss profiles of the trading 
strategies will deviate further and further away from the theoretical bounds derived based on option 
theories. 
 
2. As the percentage of systematic traders in the market exceeds a certain threshold (between 60% and 
80%) relative to the total number of market participants, the bids and offers in the market will 
concentrate on only one side of the market, especially during extreme market movements.  Market 
prices will begin to behave erratically, leading to the eventual breakdown of the market. 
 
3. Finally, any attempt to restore market liquidity by changing the “rules of the game” in the middle of 
trading is unlikely to produce the desired outcome.  The process for market agents to adjust to any  
new set of rules, as well as subsequently reversing to the original state of the market, appears to 
cause more problems than it solves by creating significant liquidity disruptions to the market.   
The goal of this paper is to determine if the findings from the earlier paper can be used to understand and 
assess potential regulatory responses, such as those listed in the Joint CFTC-SEC Preliminary and Final 
Report.  In particular, the authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010, show a pattern consistent with 
the type “flash crash” observed in our earlier study.  While some commentators assigned blame to high-
frequency trading, our analysis was unable to identify a direct link to high-frequency trading per se, but 
rather the domination of market activities by trading strategies that are responding to the same set of 
market variables in similar ways, as well as various pre-existing schemes that modify the “rules of the 
game” in the middle of trading, resulting in a significant withdrawal of liquidity during extreme market 
movements.  In addition, certain micro-structural safety mechanisms in the market, such as the uneven 
triggering of circuit breakers by the cash equity, futures and ETF markets at different times, may have 
exacerbated the problem. 
Furthermore, the triggering of the Liquidity Replenishment Points at the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), or commonly known as “go slow” mode, might have further driven liquidity out of the market 
when it was needed the most.  Only when certain stocks reached “stupid cheap” levels, other investors 
seized the opportunity to buy and market prices began restoring to levels consistent with fundamental 
valuations.  Moreover, the subsequent cancelling of trades by the NYSE has created a significant worry 
for market participants (market makers in particular) who can potentially step in to provide much-needed 
liquidity in similar episodes in the future.   
To achieve our objectives, we have constructed nine different simulations in this study, in an attempt to 
recreate various market conditions for the cascading effects leading to the type of flash crash seen on 
May 6.  Those results allow us to study the potential effects of: 
 imposing position limits by traders; 
 changing from continuous time auctions to discrete time auctions; and 
 imposing price limits during a major market dislocation, with different trigger levels. 
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2. Designing the Simulation Platform 
It has been widely speculated that the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010 was caused primarily by two factors: 
(a) trading venues with different and often inconsistent rules of operations, and (b) complex dependency 
among multiple assets (e.g., between index tracking ETFs and its component stocks).  The first factor 
contributes to the congestion of orders when trading venues slowing down unevenly, while the second 
factor contributes to the contagion of instability from one asset to other related assets.  In order to 
reconstruct the market conditions leading to the Flash Crash and to evaluate policies that could help 
preventing similar incidents, we have developed a realistic microscopic financial simulation even though, 
to the best of our knowledge, no financial simulator can reproduce faithful replications of both features. 
The simulation platform utilized in this paper is derived from the model first introduced in Cheng (2007), 
and used subsequently for analyzing extreme market conditions in Lee, Cheng and Koh (2010). In the 
following subsections, we will briefly describe the enhancements necessary for the simulation platform to 
model the two features mentioned above. 
2.1 Multiple Trading Venues 
With any sufficiently generic market engine, introducing multiple trading venues is relatively 
straightforward:  the engine can simply create additional markets according to rules as specified by the 
user. However, the key challenge of having multiple trading venues is not about creating additional 
markets, but avoiding operational bottlenecks. More specifically, we need to address how we can design 
a conceptual structure that is understandable by software agents and come up with a reasonable price 
discovery process under multiple trading venues.  
For the software agents that we plan to introduce to the system, they need to recognize the relationship 
among multiple markets. For example, for the case where a particular asset A is traded simultaneously in 
two markets, an agent needs to understand that buying and selling A in both markets will directly affect 
the position of A. In other words, agents in the simulation will need to load a conceptual mapping like the 
one illustrated in Figure 4. In our simulation design, we allow structural information to be defined 
compactly and all agents are required to load this same structural information at the starting-up phase. 
Once such mapping is loaded, an agent will then be able to keep an aggregated view on position 
balances through the linkages between markets.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: A sample market structure that agents need to understand. 
 
Another important issue that needs to be addressed when introducing multiple trading venues is how 
prices of the same asset are synchronized across different markets. Take asset A in Figure 4 as an 
example: an agent intending to establish a long position in asset A needs to decide which market to trade 
in, since markets 1 and 2 are running independently and may have different prices. Agents certainly can 
have their own logic in deciding which market to go for; however, to simplify agent design and to emulate 
Market 
1
Market 
2
Market 
3
Asset 
A
Asset 
B
Asset 
C
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real-world trading rules, we assume that all bids and offers submitted by agents will go through a 
mechanism similar to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) rule implemented in the US stock market. 
In other words, when picking which market to trade in, an agent will simply pick the market with lowest 
ask prices (from all markets) when buying and the market with highest bid price when selling. Our 
assumption is that the updates on best ask/bid prices from all markets will be instantaneous without 
delay. 
The framework presented above will allow us to design arbitrary market structures that suit our needs. 
2.2 Complex Asset Dependency 
Another important feature that we want to introduce is to allow assets to be related with each other. For 
example, the trading price of an index future should be dependent on the prices of all stock components 
this index future tracks. By allowing such dependencies, we are effectively linking up independent assets. 
An example of such dependency is illustrated in Figure Y. 
 
 
Figure 5: Introducing dependencies to assets. 
 
Prices of linked assets cannot be directly synchronized, since prices of all assets still need to be 
determined by the market. Therefore, we need to go through a market mechanism to synchronize these 
asset prices. In order to achieve such synchronization, we introduce a special agent class called the 
“Arbitrageur”. Arbitrageurs understand the relationship between assets, and they will trade whenever 
market prices are significantly out-of-sync. 
Taking Index A in Figure 5 as an example: By assuming that Stocks A, B and C are equally weighted in 
Index A, we can design the Arbitrageur using the following rules to eliminate any out-of-sync prices: 
 If                                                , then the arbitrageur should buy the basket 
of 3 stocks and sell the index. 
 If                                               , then the arbitrageur should buy the index 
and sell the basket of 3 stocks. 
The parameter   is introduced to account for market frictions like delays or transaction costs. Arbitrageur 
will constantly review its holding, and whenever any of the following conditions is met, the Arbitrageur will 
liquidate its positions: 
1) If the price discrepancy disappears, i.e.,                                       . The tolerance 
for being “sufficiently close” for liquidation can be adjusted empirically based on the bid-ask spreads 
shown in the tradable assets. 
Stock 
A
Stock 
B
Stock 
C
Index 
A
Index 
B
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2) If a perfect arbitrage is unsuccessful because of market slippage, we will implement a stop-loss rule 
to “reverse out” from any yet-to-be completed arbitrage trade based on a time trigger.   This will 
happen when say only 3 out of the 4 legs of the arbitrage trade can be executed at the intended 
prices.  This is an important feature to be included in any type of “flood to the gate” scenario, when 
one or more leg(s) of an arbitrage trade is moving away from its intended price and the Arbitrageur 
has no choice but to unwind the trade. 
3) If, instead of convergence, an arbitrage trade diverges and creates losses instead of profits, the 
Arbitrageur will automatically “reverse out” from the arbitrage trade to prevent any run-away negative 
P&L.  This is consistent with real-world practices and is another important feature to be included in 
any type of “flood to the gate” scenario.   The trigger for stop loss is set to 5% initially, and will be 
adjusted empirically based on the actual price behavior shown in the tradable assets. 
The above rules for the Arbitrageur can be easily generalized to include arbitrary number of assets and 
uneven weights. 
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3. Simulation Design 
3.1 Current Study 
As mentioned earlier, we have conducted nine different simulations in this study, in an attempt to recreate 
various market conditions for the cascading effects leading to the type of flash crash seen on May 6.  
Those results allow us to study the potential effects of: 
 imposing position limits by traders; 
 changing from continuous time auctions to discrete time auctions; and 
 imposing price limits during a major market dislocation, with different trigger levels. 
Specifically, there are the “deltas” from one simulation to the next in the current study: 
Simulation 1  Simulation 2  Compressing the action-reaction time from the “go slow” mode in 
exchange 1 to the “go slow” mode in exchange 2, in order to pinpoint the 
potential triggering conditions leading to cascading effects.  The purpose 
is to illustrate how market micro-structural issues can make a significant 
difference to market stability. 
Simulation 2  Simulation 3  Imposing position limits by trader, instead of typical position limits by 
symbols (i.e. per stock trading on each individual exchange). 
Simulation 3  Simulation 4:  Changing the clearing mechanism from continuous time auction to 
discrete time auction, which would have negate any trade execution 
advantages of high-frequency, algorithm-based trading. 
Simulation 3  Simulation 5:  Simulation 5 is a variant of Simulation 3, in which quotes are not updated 
during the slowdown. 
Simulation 3  Simulation 6:  Simulation 6 is a variant of Simulation 3, in which price limits are 
imposed when prices have dropped by more than 40% respectively, 
when compared to the base prices that are sampled from the last done 
prices every 60 seconds. 
Simulation 6  Simulation 7:  The trigger level above is set to 30% instead. 
Simulation 7  Simulation 8:  The trigger level above is set to 20% instead. 
Simulation 8  Simulation 9:  The trigger level above is set to 10% instead. 
3.2 Technical Descriptions of Market Agents 
For each stock, there are two markets in which it can be traded, with one market being roughly twice as 
large as another market (in terms of initially-available liquidity).  Each stock is serviced by a Market Maker 
(MM) that is willing to provide liquidity by earning a small fee; the Index market, on the other hand, is not 
serviced by any MM.  Besides the Market Maker, there are also Zero Intelligence (ZI) (or “random”) 
agents, Trend Following (TF) agents, and Arbitrageur (AA) agents, with the latter having been described 
in detail in Section 2.2.  Both ZI and TF agents are allowed to trade every stock available; however, only 
ZI agents are allowed to trade the Index.  When trading in the Index market, ZI agents are designed to 
understand the linkage between index and its stock components.  Whenever there are sufficiently large 
gaps between prices of index and component stocks, the AA agent will be performing arbitraging trades 
as described in Section 2.2 and pulling the Index back to its fair value in the process.  Non-convergence 
in the Index market is allowed, and is one critical element of the market that we intend to model. 
We have designated separate agents to emulate automatic stop losses and to generate the initial selling 
pressure in the Index market similar to the rush of sell orders at around 2:30PM on May 6.  A group of 4 
agents (known as Bear Market agents) will automatically start piling in sell orders quickly once the major 
11 Lee, Cheng and Koh - Liquidity Withdrawal and the “Flash Crash” on May 6, 2010 
 
market slows down, to simulate the initial triggering of sell orders by traders who are likely to interpret the 
“go slow” mode as highly-negative market sentiments.  To trigger automatic stop losses as and when the 
market suffers significant losses, a group of 3 agents will constantly monitor the stock prices.  When asset 
price drops to below 60% of initial asset price, these agents (known as Stop-Loss agents) will begin 
placing large amounts of sell orders.  For both groups of agents, the amount of sell orders each agent can 
issue is capped with a predetermined upper bound. 
In all of our simulations, we fixed the agent composition at 18 ZI agents, 27 TF agents, and 9 AA agents, 
in order to represent a market in which there is significant presence of professional traders using 
algorithm-based techniques as well as those who are looking for arbitrage opportunities. 
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4. Analysis of Simulation Results 
This Section contains a detailed analysis of our nine simulations. 
4.1 Simulation Results 
We have conducted 9 different types of simulations based on a slowdown on market 1 followed by a 
slowdown in market 2.  In each case, we have plotted out the price history (for Stocks A, B and C as well 
as the Index), the rolling exponentially-weighted volatility based on a  value of 0.9, and the trading 
volume of each asset in 30-second buckets.  The entire simulation lasted 900 seconds, which is 
comparable to the most active time period of the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010. 
4.1.1 Simulation 1 
The simulation shown in Figure 6 is based on a slowing down of Market 1 from 120 seconds to 360 
seconds, and then a slowing down of Market 2 from 240 seconds to 480 seconds.  In the first case, we 
can see that prices collapsed, rolling volatilities spiked and trading volumes picked up during the interval 
from 120 seconds to 240 seconds, and then during the interval from 400 to 600 seconds.  This 
observation is consistent with our earlier research, in that the real problem appears to be caused by 
changing the “rules of the game” in the middle of trading, instead of the simple domination of the market 
by any specific type of traders.  Since there are no changes to the fundamental demand-and-supply 
balance during the simulation (except for the initial triggering of selling orders by Bear Market agents), the 
market will function properly once it is stabilized, but the subsequent reversion to normal speed of 
clearing once again create an imbalance of demand and supply leading to significant price instabilities.  In 
addition, we observe that, in some cases, price actually hit the value of $1 which is the value of stub 
quotes left by market-makers.   
4.1.2 Simulation 2 
The simulation shown in Figure 7 is based on a slowing-down of Market 1 from 120 seconds to 240 
seconds, and then Market 2 slowed down from 180 seconds to 360 seconds.  We are interested in 
understanding what may happen as and when we push the two slow-down periods closer together, 
emulating the cascading effects among unstable parallel markets.  As expected, we no longer observe 
two distinct periods of shocks.  Even more interesting are the observations that: a) the price-shock 
periods are compressed; as a result, there really isn‟t a sufficient time lag for supply and demand 
conditions in the market to recover from the first price shock before entering the second price shock, b) 
prices go through an extended period of instability after the 360-th second or the end of the second shock 
period; and c) during the time when prices go through an extended period of instability, there continue to 
be many instances in which the Arbitrageur agents are unable to pull the Index back to its fair value.  This 
is shown in Figure 15.  Simulation 2 will be treated as our base scenario for testing other potential policy 
responses. 
4.1.3 Simulation 3 
The simulation shown in Figure 8 is based on imposing position limits by trader, instead of typical position 
limits by symbol (i.e. per stock trading on each individual exchange).  Although not apparent from the 
descriptive statistics, the markets in this simulation experienced a significant increase in violent “up and 
down” shocks, and the price graph clearly shows signs of increased price instability.  Readers should 
note that the type of extreme “up and down” shocks is actually consistent with the type of price 
movements shown on May 6.  Those shocks are not observable with exchange data at the second-by-
second level, but the authors have examined internal aggregated client data provided by a broker-dealer 
at the microsecond level showing exactly that type of extreme “up and down” shocks during the 14:30 to 
15:30 EST period on May 6.  The fact that these shocks actually become significantly more pronounced 
due to the imposition of position limits suggests that position limits are unlikely to have worked as an 
effective regulatory tool to eliminate “flash crash”-like symptoms. 
4.1.4 Simulation 4 
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The simulation shown in Figure 9 is based on changing the clearing mechanism from continuous time 
auction to discrete time auction, which would have negate any trade execution advantages of high-
frequency, algorithm-based trading.  The modified clearing mechanism does not mean that the algorithm-
based traders cannot execute trades; it only means that certain traders do not have any speed advantage 
relative to other market players, so they will profit only when they can come up with a fundamentally 
superior trading strategy that is not based on more timely execution.  Based on both the price graphs and 
the descriptive statistics, it is not obvious that negating the advantages of high-frequency trading can 
make any significant difference in maintaining market stability.   
4.1.5 Simulation 5 
The simulation shown in Figure 10 is based on Simulation 3, in which quotes are not updated during the 
slowdown.  This simulation is designed to address the following question:  Instead of a total and abrupt 
stoppage – which is generally considered by the market as a blunt and ineffective tool since it simply 
delays the resolution to any fundamental imbalances in supply and demand – what would have been 
another alternative to a simple “go slow” mode?  The typical “go slow” mode bears a certain degree of 
resemblance to discrete time auctions, in that primarily the amount of through-put in the clearing process 
is slowed down.  Therefore, it is natural to ask whether stopping the publishing of quotes will make any 
difference?  Based on both the price graphs and the descriptive statistics, it is not obvious that stopping 
the publishing of quotes could have made any significant difference in maintaining market stability.   
4.1.6 Simulations 6, 7, 8 and 9 
The simulations shown in Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 are based on Simulation 3, in which price limits are 
imposed when prices have dropped by more than 40%, 30%, 20% and 10% respectively, when compared 
to the base prices that are sampled from the “last done” prices every 60 seconds.  As a result of imposing 
this new policy, there are significant decreases in the skewness, kurtosis and maximum drawdown 
statistics, with more significant improvements as and when the trigger level is lowered.  Readers should 
note that imposing price limits does not address any fundamental supply and demand imbalances.  Such 
imbalance should result in a natural drop in prices until a new market equilibrium is found, instead of any 
extreme “up and down” shocks which rarely result in genuine price discovery and the orderly resolution of 
excessive demands/supplies.  Moreover, there are more extreme “up and down” shocks when the price 
limit trigger is set either too low (40%) or too high (10%) - that may mean that regulators are either 
intervening too late (thus not providing any relieves) or needlessly (potentially making the situation worse 
off).  The ideal trigger level seems to be between 20% and 30%, which is consistent with the intuitive 
expectations of some market practitioners.  Although we started these simulations by modifying 
Simulation 3, agent-level position limits are not breached in almost all cases, so that in practical terms 
Simulation 2 should be considered our true base scenario for these 4 simulations. 
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Figure 6.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 1 due to slow-down of Market 1 from 120 seconds to 360 seconds; Market 2 from 240 
seconds to 480 seconds.  Left axis is for stocks and right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 7.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 2 due to slow-down of Market 1 from 120 seconds to 240 seconds; Market 2 from 180 
seconds to 360 seconds. Left axis is for stocks and right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 8.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 3 due to imposing position limits by trader, instead of typical position limits by symbols (i.e. per 
stock trading on each exchange).  Left axis is for stocks and right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in 
seconds. 
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Figure 9.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 4 after changing the clearing mechanism from continuous time auction to discrete time 
auction, which would have negate any advantages of high-frequency trading.  Left axis is for stocks and 
right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 10.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 5, which is a variant of Simulation 3, but its quotes are not updated during the slowdown.  Left 
axis is for stocks and right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 11.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 6, which is a variant of Simulation 3, but price limits are imposed whenever prices have 
dropped by more than 40% when compared to the average of the last 5 trades. Left axis is for stocks and 
right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 12.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 7, which is a variant of Simulation 3, but price limits are imposed whenever prices have 
dropped by more than 30% when compared to the average of the last 5 trades. Left axis is for stocks and 
right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 13.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 8, which is a variant of Simulation 3, but price limits are imposed whenever prices have 
dropped by more than 20% when compared to the average of the last 5 trades. Left axis is for stocks and 
right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 14.  Price, Exponentially-Weighted Volatility and Trading Volume (in 30-second buckets) in 
Simulation 9, which is a variant of Simulation 3, but price limits are imposed whenever prices have 
dropped by more than 10% when compared to the average of the last 5 trades. Left axis is for stocks and 
right axis is for Index.  Time axis is in seconds. 
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Figure 15.  Comparison of synthetic fair value versus traded Index values in Simulation 2.  
 
4.2 Statistical Analysis 
The summary statistics below is computed based on second-by-second data using absolute differences 
in returns on the Index.  Because our simulated Index is composed of only 3 stocks instead of 500 
securities in the SPX, the difference in base index values means that computing the proportional 
differences may produce non-comparable (if not non-sensical) results and in particular unreliable 
skewness statistics.  Skewness and kurtosis are scale invariant, and the simulated skewness and kurtosis 
appear to be “close enough” when compared to those observed from the SPX E-mini futures market on 
May 6, 2010.  Moreover, the minimum and maximum values of the simulations are roughly about 10 times 
the size of their corresponding standard deviations.  That is not reasonable as compared to real-market 
returns on May 6, 2010 especially those of single-name stocks.  Readers are encouraged to refer to our 
earlier study for a further discussion on the challenges and goals in getting “close enough” when 
matching moments in simulating extreme market movements.  The comparison is particularly striking 
when the outputs of these simulations are lined up side by side against typical fat-tail distributions created 
by a priori mathematical assumptions.  Our assessment is that these simulations have produced price 
distributions with “reasonable resemblance” of the actual evolution of the prices on SPX E-mini futures 
from 14:30 to 15:00 EST on May 6, 2010 – changing the observation window within the 30-minute time 
frame does not result in any dramatic changes to the descriptive statistics on the prices of the SPX E-mini 
futures. 
Figure 16 plots out the comparative return distributions based on the SPX E-mini futures as well as the 
Index from Simulations 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
10
  Readers should visually examine the degree of similarity 
between the return distribution in our base scenario of Simulation 2 and that from the SPX E-mini futures.  
Not surprisingly, their skewness (-1.29 for Simulation 2 vs. -1.03 for SPX E-mini) and kurtosis (2.03 for 
Simulation 2 vs. 3.25 for SPX E-mini) statistics are also quite close.  This graph also shows how the base 
scenario evolves under the price limit triggers set at 40%, 30%, 20% and 10%, with tighter and tighter fits 
against their corresponding normal distribution curves.   
                                                          
10
 To ensure an objective comparison, “zeros” have been deleted from the return distributions, as discussed in Lee, 
Cheng and Koh 2010. 
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Stock A             Emini  
S&P* 
P&G 3M Accen- 
ture 
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
Observations 776  745  744  735  705  810  830  785  815  1794 1680  1346  656 
Mean 45.64  42.28  35.04  43.34  48.16  35.43  34.06  32.92  46.30  1108.80 60.37 81.74 40.83 
Stdev 5.72  8.37  17.95  5.03  12.90  19.86  12.68  12.68  4.40  17.39 3.20 3.46 0.45 
Skewness 0.32  -4.13  -0.66  -7.54  -3.14  -0.19  -1.05  -0.71  -0.33  -1.03 -3.58 -1.82 -0.24 
Kurtosis 1.13  2.04  4.72  2.81  11.52  1.55  2.38  1.83  1.29  3.25 17.98 5.32 1.83 
Min 40.40  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  4.90  7.40  9.10  40.30  1056.00 39.37 67.98 40.01 
Max 53.90  47.00  52.10  46.10  54.90  58.90  44.00  45.10  52.10  1130.80 62.25 85.49 41.53 
Max - Min 13.50  46.00  51.10  45.10  53.90  54.00  36.60  36.00  11.80  74.75 22.88  17.51  1.52 
CVaR(95%) -3.88  -20.09  -28.29  -8.15  -16.43  -10.05  -1.91  -3.65  -2.59  -1.54 -0.69 -1.63 -0.10 
MaxDD 0.22  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.84  0.30  0.48  0.18  0.01 0.17 0.09 0.01 
#(DD(>=10%)) 13  38  43  7  21  29  13  18  10  0  3  0  0  
*Average of available bid and ask based on second-by-second data from 14:30:00 to 14:59:59 EST on 
May 6, 2010 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on Stock A as well as the SPX E-mini futures on May 6, 2010. 
Share B             Emini  
S&P* 
P&G 3M Accen- 
ture 
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
Observations 820  804  762  787  729  798  847  807  816  1794 1680  1346  656 
Mean 39.15  53.74  40.77  43.97  49.66  23.53  31.05  38.51  43.60  1108.80 60.37 81.74 40.83 
Stdev 23.01  0.72  0.85  0.84  8.53  16.98  11.04  10.89  4.84  17.39 3.20 3.46 0.45 
Skewness -1.00  1.03  0.89  0.18  -4.27  -0.18  -0.62  -0.93  -0.96  -1.03 -3.58 -1.82 -0.24 
Kurtosis 19.52  3.47  4.34  4.32  21.67  1.19  1.53  2.29  2.66  3.25 17.98 5.32 1.83 
Min 1.00  52.70  39.90  42.70  1.00  1.00  11.20  17.30  30.70  1056.00 39.37 67.98 40.01 
Max 55.90  56.10  43.00  46.10  54.00  42.00  41.00  48.40  49.20  1130.80 62.25 85.49 41.53 
Max - Min 54.90  3.40  3.10  3.40  53.00  41.00  29.80  31.10  18.50  74.75 22.88  17.51  1.52 
CVaR(95%) -11.94  -0.59  -0.33  -1.00  -14.70  -4.79  -1.79  -1.94  -4.25  -1.54 -0.69 -1.63 -0.10 
MaxDD 0.98  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.98  0.96  0.39  0.19  0.33  0.01 0.17 0.09 0.01 
#(DD(>=10%)) 13  0  0  0  17  19  11  8  11  0  3  0  0  
*Average of available bid and ask based on second-by-second data from 14:30:00 to 14:59:59 EST on 
May 6, 2010 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on Stock B as well as the SPX E-mini futures on May 6, 2010. 
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Share C             Emini  
S&P* 
P&G 3M Accen- 
ture 
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
Observations 749  745  702  804  664 858  839  830  812  1794 1680  1346  656 
Mean 33.65  40.70  41.79  39.68  44.85  36.66  32.72  35.00  35.96  1108.80 60.37 81.74 40.83 
Stdev 13.11  16.24  12.03  8.56  0.89  13.17  11.31  11.35  4.29  17.39 3.20 3.46 0.45 
Skewness -1.87  -1.72  -1.69  -2.70  0.81  0.23  -0.74  0.23  -0.88  -1.03 -3.58 -1.82 -0.24 
Kurtosis 1.93  2.33  4.58  2.49  2.70  1.06  1.78  1.19  2.76  3.25 17.98 5.32 1.83 
Min 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  43.80  24.50  12.90  23.90  25.20  1056.00 39.37 67.98 40.01 
Max 41.90  51.10  50.00  45.00  47.30  53.30  42.90  50.50  41.10  1130.80 62.25 85.49 41.53 
Max – Min 40.90  50.10  49.00  44.00  3.50  28.80  30.00  26.60  15.90  74.75 22.88  17.51  1.52 
CVaR(95%) -7.82  -20.49  -10.48  -22.44  -0.51  -14.68  -2.79  -11.69  -5.19  -1.54 -0.69 -1.63 -0.10 
MaxDD 0.97  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.03  0.51  0.27  0.49  0.33  0.01 0.17 0.09 0.01 
#(DD(>=10%)) 11  23  13  30  0  24  18  25  32  0  3  0  0  
*Average of available bid and ask based on second-by-second data from 14:30:00 to 14:59:59 EST on 
May 6, 2010 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on Stock C as well as the SPX E-mini futures on May 6, 2010. 
Index              Emini  
S&P* 
P&G 3M Accen- 
ture 
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
Observations 684  622  637  711  714 749  746  744  752  1794 1680  1346  656 
Mean 106.55  123.43  110.85  121.80  133.93  88.62  96.31  101.97  124.41  1108.80 60.37 81.74 40.83 
Stdev 40.31  29.40  30.59  16.69  25.91  45.59  33.12  31.76  11.77  17.39 3.20 3.46 0.45 
Skewness -0.86  -1.29  -0.70  -1.94  -1.90  0.28  -0.73  -0.31  -0.15  -1.03 -3.58 -1.82 -0.24 
Kurtosis 61.30  2.03  9.87  7.05  6.47  1.40  1.90  1.60  1.74  3.25 17.98 5.32 1.83 
Min 0.80  19.48  14.83  48.60  23.39  33.10  31.50  50.50  98.90  1056.00 39.37 67.98 40.01 
Max 152.10  154.10  145.10  137.30  156.00  154.10  127.20  141.50  142.50  1130.80 62.25 85.49 41.53 
Max - Min 151.30  134.62  130.27  88.70  132.61  121.00  95.70  91.00  43.60  74.75 22.88  17.51  1.52 
CVaR(95%) -41.74  -32.01  -28.45  -10.24  -35.88  -20.99  -17.25  -11.10  -4.49  -1.54 -0.69 -1.63 -0.10 
MaxDD 0.99  0.82  0.86  0.44  0.80  0.40  0.43  0.20  0.15  0.01 0.17 0.09 0.01 
#(DD(>=10%)) 52  60  58  12  43  28  23  12  2  0  3  0  0  
*Average of available bid and ask based on second-by-second data from 14:30:00 to 14:59:59 EST on 
May 6, 2010 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on Index as well as the SPX E-mini futures on May 6, 2010. 
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Figure 16.  Comparative return distributions based on the SPX E-mini futures as well as the Index from 
Simulations 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
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4.3 Agents P&Ls 
We have plotted the realized and unrealized P&Ls for all agent types in Simulations 1 and 2 in Figures 
17, 18, 19 and 20.  Our observations from these base scenarios are: 
1. In the absence of market interventions, Market Makers almost always make profits by design of their 
trading algorithms. 
 
2. Neither the ZI (or “random”) agents nor the trend follower TF agents are able to make consistent 
profits. 
 
3. As expected, Arbitrageurs may suffer heavy losses when the Index fails to converge to its fair values. 
 
4. The Bear Market seller may or may not make any profits, depending on the market‟s recovery path.  
 
5. The Stop-Loss agents will almost always lose money in flash crash by selling at unusually low prices 
that consequently recover. 
If trades are “busted” at a certain level, then the P&Ls of the Market Makers will become uncertain.  Doing 
so is expected to have a highly negative impact on the Market Makers‟ willingness to participate in the 
markets during flash crashes.  Without their participation in such markets, the authors contend that:  a) it 
will even be more likely for the market to break down faster when liquidity is withdrawn faster from the 
market, and b) it will be more difficult for the market to recover from the destabilizing effects of any “flash 
crash”. 
In addition, the unrealized P&Ls for all agent types in Simulations 3, 4, 7 and 8 (Figures 21, 22, 23 and 
24) show that: 
1. Both imposing position limits by trader and changing the clearing mechanism from continuous time 
auction to discrete time auction may be ineffective in terms of eliminating “flash crash”-like symptoms, 
but these measures do not cause any unexpected changes to the P&L patterns among different types 
of market players.  
 
2. In Simulations 7 and 8 where price limits are imposed, it appears that certain professional traders are 
able to make profits at the expense of the Market Maker and to some extend the ZI (or “random”) 
agents.   
Observation 2 is troubling, but not hugely surprising.  When the market knows which direction a particular 
asset is going to trade because of regulatory intervention, professional traders can usually find ways to 
take advantage of the anticipated market movements.  Market participants who are likely to be on the 
losing side of their trades will be the retail-like zero intelligence investors who typically deploy 
unsophisticated trading strategies assuming a fairly even distribution of market ups and downs, or market 
makers who are obligated to quote under the assumption that bids and asks should be reasonably even 
and random.  From a regulatory viewpoint, imposing price limits can be an effective policy to eliminate 
“flash crash”-like symptoms, but nonetheless one that may create unintended fairness issues for certain 
market participants. 
4.3.1 “Busting” Trade 
Finally, we used the base scenario of Simulation 2 to test the potential P&L impacts due to “busting 
trades” at or below 60% of the opening price of the asset traded: 
1. If a long position is cancelled by the exchange after the trading session, then it is assume that the 
agent has to “replace” the position at the asset‟s closing price, resulting in a negative P&L impact. 
 
2. If a short position is cancelled by the exchange after the trading session, then it is assume that the 
agent has to “replace” the position at the asset‟s closing price, resulting in a positive P&L impact. 
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The most interesting observation from Table 5 is that Market Makers and Zero-Intelligence end up 
bearing most of the impacts.  These 2 agent types must quote or place trades based on the simple 
assumption that the bids and offers are evenly distributed.  They are likely to suffer whenever there is a 
massive market adjustment in any one direction.  Exchange officials should be aware of these unintended 
fairness issues before deploying the blunt tool to “bust” trades. 
Agent Type Aggregated P&L without 
busted trades($) 
Aggregated P&L with 
busted trades($) 
Delta P&L($) 
Market Maker (MM) 8,220,800 2,341.30 -8,218,458.70 
Zero-Intelligence (ZI) 1,114,700 228,960.00 -885,740.00 
Trend Follower (TF) -5,930,600 184,590.00 6,115,190.00 
Arbitrager (AA) -132,040 -26,852.00 105,188.00 
Bear Market (B) -1,487,700 -148,520.00 1,339,180.00 
Stop Loss (SL) -1,581,800 -37,224.00 1,544,576.00 
 
Table 5. Potential P&L impacts of different agent types due to “busting trades” at 60% or below the 
opening price of each asset. 
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Figure 17.  Realized P&L in Simulation 1 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 18.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 1 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 19.  Realized P&L in Simulation 2 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
32 Lee, Cheng and Koh - Liquidity Withdrawal and the “Flash Crash” on May 6, 2010 
 
Figure 20.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 2 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 21.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 3 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 22.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 4 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 23.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 7 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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Figure 24.  Unrealized P&L in Simulation 8 for different agent types. (MM = Market Maker, ZI = Random 
Agents; TF = Trend Follower, AA = Arbitrageur, B = Bear-Market Seller; SL = Stop-Loss Agents) 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The authors contend that the events of May 6, 2010 exhibit patterns consistent with the type of “flash 
crash” observed in their earlier study.  While some commentators assigned blame on the May 6, 2010 
“flash crash” to high-frequency trading, the authors suggest that the issue may be less about high-
frequency trading per se, but rather the domination of market activities by trading strategies that are 
responding to the same set of market variables in similar ways, as well as various pre-existing schemes 
that modify the “rules of the game” in the middle of trading.  The consequent lack of market participants 
interested in the “other side” of their trades may result in a significant liquidity withdrawal during extreme 
market movements.   
This paper describes an attempt to reconstruct the critical elements of the market events of May 6, 2010 
based on the five hypotheses posed initially by the Joint CFTC-SEC Preliminary Report and the 
corresponding Final Report.  The authors contend that the simulated asset price distributions have shown 
“reasonable resemblance” in descriptive statistics without over-fitting historical data. 
Our specific recommendations are: 
1. Any scheme to deliberately “slow down” trading does not address the fundamental demand and 
supply imbalance leading to flash crashes, and it may cause more problems than it solves. 
 
2. In a “fragmented” market with parallel trading venues, the “action-reaction” nature of complex 
exchange rules to alter the speed of trading may initiate a chain reaction that may drive liquidity 
further out of the aggregate market.  Thus, it is important for parallel trading venues to coordinate 
their responses to avoid creating unintended domino effects. 
 
3. The uneven slowing-down of trading at different trading venues often results in non-convergent fair 
values, because there is no or limited liquidity to complete one of more “legs” in an arbitrage trade.  
Arbitrageurs may suffer heavy losses in such markets, resulting in further withdrawal of liquidity due 
to their needs to “reverse out” from loss-making, incomplete arbitrage trades.  Thus, it is important for 
parallel trading venues to coordinate the execution of their responses – in the event that going into a 
“slow mode” is the correct response, then its execution should be done in parallel by all relevant 
exchanges to avoid needlessly amplifying the uncertainties faced by market participants. 
 
4. The problem appears to be less about the slowing-down of trading per se.  It is about the potential 
liquidity withdrawal due to the adjustments and chaos as a result of the initial slowing-down, as well 
as from the subsequent adjustments once the “normal” speed of trading is resumed. 
 
5. “Busting trades” may discourage key participants such as Market Makers from trading in the markets 
as and when they are most needed.  Unless there are clear technical errors involved, busting trades 
at arbitrary price levels is a blunt instrument that should be used sparingly and with extreme caution. 
 
6. Price limits appear to be more effective than different implementation of positions limit in terms of 
stabilizing the market during the period of time when the market is finding its new equilibrium due to 
supply and demand imbalances. 
 
7. Price limits do have limitations.  When professional traders are reasonably certain of potential market 
outcomes, they can normally find ways to make profits based on trading algorithms.  That creates 
fairness issues for unsophisticated retail investors or market makers who are under obligations to 
quote.  Therefore, the deployment of such blunt tools should be a regulatory policy of last resort.  
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